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QUES.I'IONS PRESENTED 
1. Whether, in order to establish a violation of Title 
VII, a plaintiff must prove not only that she was the 
victim of prohibited discrimination but also that the 
challenged employment decision would have been made 
in her favor in the absence of discrimination. 
2. Whether a proven violator of Title VII may avoid 
a grant of specific relief to the injured employee unless 
it proves by evidence of a clear and convincing character 
that it would have taken the same employment action in 
any event for a separate lawful reason. 
3. Whether it was clearly erroneous for the district 
court below to find that petitioner's denial of partner-
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ANN B. HOPKINS, 
Petitioner 
Respondent 
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit 
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT 
1. Introduction. Ann Hopkins proved that Price Wa-
terhouse's rejection of her candidacy for partnership was 
caused, at least in part, by discrimination based on sex. 
In statutory terms, she proved that Price Waterhouse 
limited her chances for advancement by utilizing a part-
nership admissions process that "tend [ed] to deprive" 
her of employment opportunities because of her sex. See 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (2). The central question in this 
case is whether Hopkins had to prove anything more 
than this in order to establish a violation of Title VII-
specifically whether ( as petitioner contends) Hopkins 
had the additional burden of proving that she would have 
become a partner in the absence of discrimination. 
Acceptance of petitioner's · contention-which was re-
jected by the courts below-would result in a significant 
erosion of Title VII's protections. This is not what the 
2 
statute says, it is not what Congress intended when it 
wrote the law, and it is inconsistent with the decisions 
of this Court in related areas. 
2. Hopkins' Credent'ials. Price Waterhouse engages 
in accounting and management consulting in 90 offices 
across the United States. Organized as a partnership, 
the firm had 662 partners at the time this litigation be-
gan, of whom just seven were women. Ann Hopkins was 
a senior manager in Price Waterhouse's Office of Gov-
ernment Services in Washington, D.C., which specialized 
in securing and managing contracts with Federal agen-
cies. Hopkins herself specialized in the application of 
computer-based technology to large information systems, 
and she was a stellar performer.. She was instrumental 
in securing $34-$44 million in new business for Price 
Waterhouse, including contracts with the Departments of 
State and Agriculture, and she effectively managed the 
resulting engagements. 
The district court found that Hopkins' "clients appear 
to have been very pleased with her work" (Petitioner's 
Appendix, hereafter "Pet. A.pp.," 43a), and the record 
supports this. At trial, two senior Department of State 
officials, both at the Assistant Sec:uetary level, testified 
for Hopkins. 'The Comptroller of the Department termed 
her performance '·'excellent" ·and said that she was "ex-
tremely competent, intelligent . . . strong and forthright, 
very productive, energetic and -creative"-and that she 
had a -sense of humor, ,too (Tr. 148, 150). T:he Assistant 
Secretary for Administration and .Security agreed and 
said that he particularly prized Hopkins' "intellectual 
clarity"; he also -said that 'he lhad tried to hire her to 
work at State ( T·r. 156--517;). 
In the summer of 1982, the Office of Government Serv-
ices nominated Hopkins for partnership in Price Water-
house. Nomination is ·the 1first -step iin :a complex admis-
sions process that ,occurs annually and is about nine 




each year, and there is no ceiling on the number ad-
mitted. Hopkins was one of 88 candidates under consid-
eration in the 1982-83 admissions cycle; the other 87 
were men. She had brought in more new business than 
any of the men ; indeed, none of the male nominees even 
approached the amount of business that she had gen-
erated. She had also billed more hours than any of the 
men ( Pet. App. 4a). Her office's endorsement, which 
accompanied her nomination, said that 
Ann Hopkins performed virtually at the partner level 
for the U.S. State Department. While many partners 
were "involved"' with the client, State Department 
officials viewed' Ann as the project manager . . . 
* * * * 
In her five years with the firm, she has demonstrated 
conclusively that she has the capacity and capability 
to contribute significantly to the growth and profit-
ability of the firm. Her strong character, indepen-
dence and integrity are- well recognized by her clients 
and peers. Ms. Hopkins has outstanding oral and 
written communication skills. She has a good busi-
ness sense, an ability to grasp and handle quickly 
the most complex issues, and strong leadership 
qualities. 
( Pl. Ex. 15; emphasis in original.) 
In April 1983· Price Waterhouse admitted 4 7 of the 
8-8 candidates. Hopkins was not among them; instead 
she was placed· on "hold," which meant that she was 
eligible for future consideration, assuming renomination 
by her office. Later, after again being passed over for 
partnership, she left Price Waterhouse and filed an ad-
ministrative charge of sex discrimination that culmi-
nated in this Title VII litigation.1 
i1 It is the first rejection for partnership that is the subject of 
this petition. Hopkins was passed over the second time because 
two partners in her own office opposed her candidacy and the office 
therefore declined to renominate her. Unanimity is not required 
for a nomination, and a male candidate from St. Louis had been 
4 
3. The Partnership Admissions Process. Price Water-
house's rejection of Ann Hopkins' candidacy for partner-
ship was the product of a unique collegial decision-
making process. The process begins with nomination of 
candidates by local offices. Thereafter any of the firm's 
partners, wherever located, may submit written com-
ments on nominees ( either "long form" or "short form," 
depending on how well a partner knows a particular can-
didate) . In practice few partners submit comments. An 
Admissions Committee then considers the partners' writ-
ten remarks as well as other comments-formal and in-
formal-obtained during office visits and makes a rec-
ommendation to the Policy Board, the firm's governing 
body. The Policy Board makes the final decision on 
whether to admit a nominee to partnership. 
As is apparent, there are many places in the admis-
sions process where the final decision can he influenced 
-and hence where discrimination can affect the decision. 
Price Waterhouse pays especially close attention to nega-
tive comments about a candidate, and strong opposition 
by even a few partners may he sufficient to scuttle a 
candidacy. That is what happened to Ann Hopkins. The 
decision about her was made collectively, and a large 
number of men had a hand in it, including the members 
of the Admissions Committee and Policy Board. Even 
so, less than five per cent of Price Waterhouse's part-
ners submitted written comments on Hopkins. Many of 
these were strong supporters. It was the negative com-
ments of fewer than ten partners that blocked her ad-
mission. 
Opponents focused not on Hopkins' objective qualifica-
tions-these were unquestioned-but rather on her "in-
terpersonal skills." And as the district court found, most 
nominated and admitted over the opposition o.f at least three part-
ners in his office (Pl. Ex. 20). Given the difficulties that Hopkins 
had earlier encountered, however, the partners in her office believed 
that unanimity was needed for renomination, because "[w]ithout 
strong support within [her] office, it was felt that her candidacy 




of the opposition appeared in "short form" comments 
from partners who had "limited contact" with her (Pet. 
App. 44a). Nevertheless, . these comments were "deter-
minative" (id.), because "the firm's evaluation process 
gave substantial weight" to the negative views ( Pet. 
App. 58a). Put another way, "[t]he Policy Board gave 
great weight to the negative views of individuals who 
had very little contact" with Hopkins (Pet. App. 55a). 
Joseph Connor, the firm's Senior Partner and Chairman 
of its Policy Board, confirmed this, saying that "those 
who had less than full time involvement with Ann, were 
in effect the deciders on this one." 2 
Since Price Waterhouse acknowledged-and the dis-
trict court found-that Hopkins' admission to partner-
ship was thwarted by the views of a few men who did 
not know her well, the issue for Title VII purposes was 
whether the expression of these views was the product 
of sex discrimination. The question was not whether 
Hopkins was perfect in every respect; the court observed 
that her conduct provided "ample justification" for com-
plaints about her (Pet. App. 47a). The inquiry, how-
ever, did not end there. For the issue was not whether 
there were grounds for concern but instead whether con-
cern would have been expressed in the same fashion-
and with the same degree of intensity-about a man.13 
2 J. Connor deposition 62. Mr. Connor's videotaped deposition was 
played at trial and is part of the record in this case (see R. 34 and 
Tr. 234-36). 
3 In its brief, petitioner dredges up every unflattering comment 
ever made about Hopkins and presents these in a one-sided fashion. 
Many of these concerned events early in her career at Price Water-
house, i.e., before the summer of 1981 (Tr. 203); Thomas Beyer, 
the head of her office, said she "responded well" to discussions 
about these matters, so there was "no question . . . that Ann 
Hopkins was a valid partner candidate" at the time she was nomi-
nated in 1982 (Tr. 204). Indeed, virtually everyone who worked 
· with Hopkins for any period of time admired and respected her. 
Thus three high level professionals who had served on her staff-
. a man and two women-testified on her behalf. All three said that 
she was demanding but fair (including the individual who remarked 
6 
Here it is significant that negative comments about 
interpersonal skills were commonplace in the admissions 
process at Price Waterhouse but did not necessarily prove 
fatal for male candidates. For example, in 1982 the 
Policy Board considered a man who conveyed the image 
of a "Marine drill sergeant" and who was said to be 
"crude, crass, etc." (Tr. 286-87). Joseph Connor ac-
knowledged that this candidate's manner and style raised 
serious problems. Yet a member of the Policy Board 
defended the candidate, saying that "[h]e is a man's 
man; he is very direct," and the Board decided to admit 
him (id.; Pl. Ex. 20). A year later, at the same time 
that Hopkins was being considered, the Admissions Com-
mittee noted that another candidate was 
aggressive and self confident. It is apparent that he 
has, at times, carried' these traits to excess with the 
result that a number of partners comment on him in 
such terms as "lacking maturity," "wise-guy atti-
tude," "headstrong," "abrasive and overbearing'' and 
"cocky." The . . . partners rate him relatively low 
in the managerial skills and personal attributes cate-
gories as a result of these. traits. 
( Pl. Ex. 25.) The Policy Boa:rd decided to admit this 
candidate, too. And when the Chairman of the Admis-
sions Committee was asked, at trial whether still other 
men had become partners despite concerns about their 
interpersonal skills, he responded, "Oh, yes" ( Tr. 292) . 
about "diplomacy, patience and guts"), and all three saiff that they 
would like to work with her again (Tr. 417-440). Moreover, when 
Hopkins was assigned responsibility for managing her office's 
Word Processing Department. in 1982, she performed better than 
the two partners who preceded her; Mr. Beyer said that this was 
because "she addressed the personal problems of people on the 
staff," which was "one of the first times ... someone at that level, 
partner or manager . . . [got] involv.ed with the people them-
selves" (Tr. 208-211). The point here is, that the situation was 
much more complex and; ambiguous . than petitioner asserts. For 
this reason it was essential to inquire-as the district court did-
whether Hopkins' sex contributed to the. manner and intensity, of 






This did not mean that the men admitted despite these concerns were situated similarly to Hopkins; indeed the district court found otherwise. But this evidence did show that a perceived problem with interpersonal skills was not necessarily sufficient to defeat a candidacy. What was important was whether that concern was translated into strong opposition by some of the part-ners-as with Hopkins-or into mild criticism or even approbation (" [h]e is a man's man"). 
4. The Decision of the District Court. Hopkins al-leged that she was denied partnership because of her sex, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. In deter-mining whether the Act was violated, the district court separately considered three arguments, although it called them "closely interrelated" ( Pet. App. 45a) . 
As noted above, the court did not find that concerns about Hopkins' interpersonal skills were groundless. Nor, as also noted, did the court find that liability could be established simply through a comparison between Hop~ kins and men who were admitted as partners despite concerns about their personalities. This was because the men and Hopkins were not similarly situated in all ma-terial respects. For example, some of the men were from other offices and had .skills for which Price Waterhouse had special need, so that a special "business decision" was made to admit them. In addition, they had received fewer "no" votes., and the negative comments about them were "less intense" than those directed at Hopkins ( Pet. App. 49a). 
Petitioner trumpets these findings, but they did not resolve the vital question of whether the negative com-ments about Hopkins-and their intensity-resulted from sex discrimination. This was pivotal, since it was un-disputed that Hopkins' candidacy was blocked by the negative views of partners who did not know her well. Addressing this point, the district court accepted Hop-kins' central argument: "that she was not evaluated as 
8 
a manager, but as a woman manager, based on a sexual 
stereotype that prompts [some] males to regard asser-
tive behavior in women as being more offensive and in-
tolerable than comparable behavior in men because some 
men do not regard it as appropriate feminine behavior" 
(Pet. App. 51a). 
The court detailed the evidence supporting this con-
clusion, including what the dissent below called a "smok-
ing gun" ( Pet. App. 31a) : After Hopkins learned in the 
spring of 1983 that she had not been chosen as a part-
ner, she discussed her chances for future selection with 
Thomas Beyer. Beyer was the partner-in-charge of her 
office and an ardent supporter, and the district court 
found that he was "responsible for telling [Hopkins] 
what problems the Policy Board had identified with her 
candidacy." Beyer advised her to 
walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress 
more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, 
and wear jewelry. 
( Pet. App. 52a.) 
Petitioner has tried throughout this litigation to down-
play the significance of this evidence, but it was telling 
in its own right and was also consistent with the other 
proof of a double standard. For example, the district 
court found that Hopkins' "[s] upporters indicated that 
her critics judged her harshly due to her sex" (Pet. App. 
51a), and the Policy Board's decision on Hopkins re-
cited that she had a "lot of talent" but needed "social 
grace" (Pet. App. 7a). 
The court also considered the testimony of Dr. Susan 
Fiske, a "well qualified expert" whose credentials were 
not challenged by petitioner at trial (Joint Appendix, 
hereafter "J.A.," 25). As the court found, 
Dr. Fiske testified that situations, like that at Price 
Waterhouse, in which men evaluate women based on · 
limited contact with the individual in a traditionally 






foster stereotyping. One common form of stereo-
typing is that women engaged in assertive behavior 
are judged more critically because aggressive conduct 
is viewed as a masculine characteristic. 
( Pet. App. 54a.) 
In particular, Dr. Fiske testified that a well developed 
body of research documents the fact that certain condi-
tions encourage stereotyping based on sex, that all these 
conditions were present at Price Waterhouse in the de-
cisionmaking process on Hopkins' candidacy, and that the 
pattern of comments on Hopkins was consistent with 
the existence of stereotyping. Dr. Fiske concluded "with 
reasonable certainty" that sexual stereotyping played a 
"major determining role" in the decision about Hopkins 
(J.A. 28-29). 
According to Dr. Fiske, conditions that foster stereo-
typing include "rarity"-the presence of only one or a 
handful of women in the group being evaluated-and 
the use of criteria and sources of information that are 
ambiguous. In Hopkins' situation rarity was easily es-
tablished-she was the only woman among 88 candidates 
in the partnership pool-and the criteria relating to in-
terpersonal skills ( as opposed, say, to business genera-
tion) were ambiguous. In addition, the source of much 
information was also suspect, since many of the com-
ments were based "on the briefest of encounters" with 
Hopkins (J.A. 33) .4 Analysis of the comments showed 
that Hopkins was specifically advised to behave more 
like a woman, and that conduct seen as "outspoken" or 
"independent" by her supporters became "overbearing" 
or "abrasive" when viewed by her opponents: "I see a 
very striking contrast in the way the same behavior gets 
framed" (J.A. 61). Dr. Fiske pointed out that the view 
of a forceful woman as abrasive is consistent with atti-
tudes grounded on stereotypes (J.A. 30-31). She also 
4 This observation is in line with the district court's finding 
that Hopkins' candidacy was blocked by those who did not know 
her well (see text accompanying n.2, supra). 
10 
pointed to the extreme intensity of much of the opposi-
tion to Hopkins and said that this was likewise char-
acteristic of stereotyping, particularly when voiced by 
those who did not know her well, e.g., one partner call-
ing Hopkins "potentially dangerous," another referring 
to her as "universally disliked" even though she had many 
strong supporters (J.A. 39, 60, 66). 
Dr. Fiske's conclusion that sexual stereotyping played 
a major role in the decision on Hopkins was based not 
only on partners' evaluations but on the "convergence 
of . . . indicators" of stereotyping ( J .A. 56) : 
I drew the conclusion based on rather strong ante-
cedent conditions, having somebody who was in an 
extreme minority condition, ambiguous criteria and 
ambiguous information[,] and there seemed to me 
what I call several converging indicators which in-
cluded the categorical things, trying to get her to do 
things in a more feminine fashion. Charm school. 
Needs more social grace to overcompensate for being 
a woman. Those are comments that talk about be-
havior in light of her gender, her sex specifically. 
The overly intense negativity and the divided opin-
ion that resulted from that, those are all factors that 
-all indicators that as a group, you know, contrib-
uted to my conclusion about the case. 
(J.A. 76-77.) " 
ln addition to examining Price Waterhouse's treat-
ment of Hopkins, the district court also found that other 
women had been rejected on similar grounds, i.e., "be-
cause partners believed that they were curt, brusque and 
abrasive, acted like 'Ma Barker' or tried to be 'one of 
the boys'" (Pet. App. 52a). And the court found that 
one partner had "repeatedly commented that he could 
not consider any woman seriously as a partnership can-
didate and believed that women were not even capable 
6 Dr. Fiske's testimony was not idiosyncratic or based on her 
own subjective judgment. Instead her approach was entirely con-
sistent with the consensus of researchers in her field. See generally 







of functioning as senior managers-yet the firm took no 
action to discourage his comments" (id.). 
Based on its assessment of all the evidence, the dis-
trict court found that "stereotyping played an undefined 
role in blocking [Hopkins'] admission to the partnership 
in this instance" (Pet. App. 54a). The court indicated 
that this was unconscious on the part of individual eval-
uators but carried the analysis "one step further" and 
surveyed the evidence showing that the Policy Board ig-
nored "clear indications" of "discriminatory stereotyp-
ing" in the partnership admissions process (Pet. App. 
55a) . The court then found that: 
Although the stereotyping by individual partners 
may have been unconscious on their part, the main-
tenance of a system that gave weight to such biased 
criticisms was a conscious act of the partnership as 
a whole. 
(Pet. App. 56a.) 
This was unlawful, since "[a] female cannot be ex-
cluded from a partnership dominated by males if a sex-
ual bias plays a part in the decision and the employer is 
aware that such bias played a part in the exclusion de-
cision" (id.). The court summarized its findings as fol-
lows: 
Comments influenced by sex stereotypes were made 
by partners; the firm's evaluation process gave sub-
stantial weight to these comments; and the partner-
ship failed to address the conspicuous problem of 
stereotyping in partnership evaluations. While these 
three factors might have been innocent alone, they 
combined to produce discrimination in the case of 
this plaintiff. The Court finds that the Policy Board's 
decision not to admit the plaintiff to partnership was 
tainted by discriminatory evaluations that were tli.e 
direct result of its failure to address the evident 
problem of sexual stereotyping in partners' evalua-
tions. 
( Pet. App. 58a-59a.) 
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Having found a violation of Title VII, the district 
court turned to relief .'6 The court termed the decision on 
Hopkins a "mixture of legitimate and discriminatory 
considerations" and noted that it could not say that she 
would have become a partner in the absence of discrim-
ination ( Pet. App. 59a). But after a violation had been 
established, the burden was on Price Waterhouse, be~ 
cause "once a plaintiff proves that sex discrimination 
played a role in an employment decision, the plaintiff is 
entitled to relief unless the employer has demonstrated 
by clear and convincing evidence that the decision would 
have been the same absent discrimination" (id.). The 
court explained that, " [ w] here sex discrimination is 
present, even if a promotion decision is a mixture of 
legitimate and discriminatory considerations, uncertain-
ties must be resolved against the employer so that the 
remedial purposes of Title VII will not be thwarted by 
saddling an individual subject to discrimination with an 
impossible burden of proof" (Pet. App. 59a-60a). The 
court found that petitioner had not carried its burden 
( id.) .7 
5. The Decision of the Court of Appeals. The court of 
appeals affirmed the determination that Title VII had 
been violated. The court said that "Hopkins demon-
strated, and the District Court found, that she was 
treated less favorably than male candidates because of 
her sex" (Pet. App. 19a). That is, she had shown that 
"her gender was a significant motivating factor in her 
failure to make partner" (Pet. App. 22a). The evidence 
noted by the court of appeals on this point consisted of 
6 This portion of the court's opinion is captioned "Remedy" (Pet. 
App. 59a). 
7 Ultimately the court declined to award specific relief on grounds 
unrelated to this petition: that Hopkins had not proved constructive 
discharge and had failed to present adequate proof on damages. The 
court of appeals reversed this aspect of the trial court's decision 
and remanded for entry of "full relief" (Pet. App. 28a). The 





the comments made by the partners about Hopkins,8 the 
expert testimony, and comments made about other women 
candidates in prior years. Citing Anderson v. City of 
Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564 (1985), the court rejected Price 
Waterhouse's "piecemeal attack on the District Court's 
finding, . . . [ which] ignores the fact that we must view 
the evidence in its entirety, and is in any event unequal 
to the task of demonstrating that the court's finding is 
clearly erroneous" ( Pet. App. 12a) . 
The court of appeals understood that the record also 
contained, as the trial court had found, other reasons for 
concern about Hopkins. Thus this was a "case of mixed-
motivation," since the district court had found that both 
lawful and unlawful motives "were significant factors 
in the firm's decision" on Hopkins (Pet. App. 25a). 
Given this, the court of appeals held that Price Water-
house could avoid a liability determination only by prov-
. ing that "impermissible bias was not the determinative 
factor" in the decision on Hopkins (id.) . The court said 
that such a showing must be made by clear and convinc-
ing evidence and noted that petitioner had not made it. 
Hence the court ruled that a violation had been estab-
lished ( id. ) . 
In his dissent, Judge Williams had "no quarrel" with 
the principle that "a party acting with one permissible 
motive and one unlawful one may prevail only by affima-
tively proving that it would have acted as it did even if 
the forbidden motive were absent" (Pet. App. 38a). He 
believed, however, that there was insufficient evidence to 
support a finding that Hopkins' rejection was caused, 
even in part, by discrimination; i.e., he felt that sexual 
8 These included various descriptions. of Hopkins-from sup-
porters as well as opponents-as "macho," "a somewhat masculine 
hard-nosed" manager, one who "overcompensated for being a 
woman," who needed a "course at charm school" (Pet. App. 12a-
.. 13a). Here the court saw as "[p]erhaps most telling ... Price 
Waterhouse's desperate attempt to erase from the record Thomas 
Beyer's advice to Hopkins" to behave "more femininely" (Pet. 
App. 13a-14a). 
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stereotyping was "not plausibly related to the decision" 
on her candidacy (Pet. App. 39a). 
In making this argument on insufficiency of evidence, 
Judge Williams tried to neutralize what he termed the 
"smoking gun"-Thomas Beyer's advice to Hopkins to 
behave more femininely (Pet. App. 31a). And on this 
point, he could only assert that the district court was 
"clearly erroneous" in finding that Beyer was speaking 
for the firm, i.e., "in fulfillment of his 'responsib [ility] 
for telling [Hopkins] what problems the Policy Board 
had identified with her candidacy'" (Id.). Judge Wil-
liams' discussion of clear error did not mention either 
Rule 52, Fed. R. Civ. P., or this Court's treatment of the 
rule in the Title VII context in Anderson v. City of Besse-
mer, 470 U.S. 564. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Violation and remedy are separate matters under 
Title VII. Fadhl v. City & County of San Francisco, 741 
F.2d 1163 (9th Cir. 1984). The initial question in any 
Title VII case-and the one on which the plaintiff at all 
times bears the burden of persuasion-is whether there 
has been a violation of the Act. Once a violation has 
been established, however, the employer has the oppor-
tunity to attempt to limit relief by proving that the chal-
lenged decision would have been the same even in the 
absence of discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (g). 
That is, after a violation has been proved, the burden of 
proof shifts to the employer to try to narrow the remedy 
due the plaintiff. The district court correctly applied 
these principles in finding that Price Waterhouse violated 
Title VII when it rejected Ann Hopkins' candidacy for 
partnership. 
1. Some Title VII cases are amenable to binary analy-
sis, and the trier of fact can determine that unlawful 
discrimination either was or was not the motivation for 
a particular employment decision. If it was, a violation 






But sometimes the trier of fact may determine after 
reviewing the evidence that both lawful and unlawful 
motives contributed to a decision-that, as here, the 
"decision is a mixture of legitimate and discriminatory 
considerations" (Pet. App. 59a). In such a case, what 
happens if the plaintiff has not shown, in addition, that 
the challenged decision would have been made in his favor 
in a bias-free environment? Is a violation also established 
here? 
Petitioner says no, but this is wrong. The plaintiff's 
burden of proving a Title VII violation is satisfied by 
showing that an unlawful factor contributed to an em-
ployment decision, even if lawful factors may also have 
been present. It would be "destructive of the purposes of 
[ the Act] to require the plaintiff to establish in addition 
the difficult hypothetical proposition that, had there been 
no discrimination, the employment decision would have 
been made in his favor." Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d 1364, 
1366 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Such a requirement would also 
run counter to the statutory language, Title VII's history 
and the decisions of this Court in related contexts. ( Our 
position on these points is in many respects similar to that 
of the Solicitor General; see Brief for United States.) 
Title VII's prohibitions on employer conduct are set 
forth in Sections 703(a) (1) and (2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a) (1),(2). Together, these two provisions make un-
lawful virtually any action affecting an employee taken 
"because of" the employee's race, color, religion, sex or 
national origin. These provisions penalize employer con-
duct--not thoughts-but nothing in the text of the stat-
ute limits liability to those situations in which an imper-
missible motive is the sole cause of a decision. On the 
contrary, Congress rejected an amendment to Section 703 
providing that a violation would arise only if an employ-
ment decision was made "solely because of" an improper 
motive. 110 Cong. Rec. H2728, S13838 ( 1964). 
In addition, Section 703 (a) (2) makes it unlawful for 
an employer to "limit" his employees in any way that 
16 
would "deprive or tend to deprive" them of employment 
opportunities because of race, sex, etc. (emphasis sup-
plied). This language plainly reaches the "mixed motive" 
case, since it is the very presence of a lawful motive that 
makes it uncertain whether unlawful discrimination has 
worked an absolute deprivation. What can be said in such 
situations is that there is a "tend[ency] to deprive" an 
employee of job opportunities, and the statutory text is 
clear that this is sufficient to establish a violation of the 
Act. 
The 1972 amendments to Title VII highlight the Con-
gressional purpose of purging the workplace of all dis-
crimination. In 1972 Congress extended Title VII to Fed-
eral agencies by adding a new Section 717, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-16, and the aim was to make the substantive law 
governing the private sector applicable to the Federal gov-
ernment. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 547 (1974). 
Section 717 (a) confirms that Title VII is violated when-
ever an unlawful motive contributes to an employment 
decision, since it provides that "all personnel actions af-
fecting [Federal employees] ... shall be made free from 
any discrimination ... " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (a) (em-
phasis supplied) . 
In NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 
U.S. 393 ( 1983), the Court examined a procedure under 
which the General Counsel of the Labor Board satisfied 
his burden of proving an unfair labor practice by showing 
that an employment decision was caused "at least in 
part" by anti-union animus. Id. at 400 n.5. The em-
ployer could then avoid a "violation adjudication" ( equiv-
alent to a judicial finding of liability) by proving that 
the same decision would have been made even absent un-
lawful motivation. The Court approved this scheme and 
expressly rejected the contention-identical to petitioner's 
here-that the General Counsel had to prove "not only 
that a forbidden motivation contributed to the discharge 
but also that the discharge would not have taken place 
independently of the protected conduct." Id. at 400-401. 
The Court also observed that the Board could have chosen 
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to shift the burden at the remedy stage, id. at 402, as several courts have done under Title VIL In granting its approval, the Court noted that the Board had relied heavily on Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1974), a First Amendment case in which the Court held that the burden of proof shifted to the employer after the plaintiff showed that an impermissible motive "played a role" in his firing. See Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. at 403. 
The Court has ruled elsewhere that a plaintiff's burden of proof is satisfied by showing that an unlawful motive contributed to a decision, even if lawful motives were also present. E.g., Mt. Healthy; Village of Arlingtoo Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). In-deed, Arlington Heights characterized Washington v. Davis as holding that a plaintiff is "not require [ d] . . . to prove that the challenged action rested solely on ra-cially discriminatory purposes." 429 U.S. at 265. This is so because a legislative or administrative body rarely makes "a decision motivated by a single concern," so it cannot be said "even that a particular purpose was the 'dominant' or 'primary' one." Id. This is significant be-cause Price Waterhouse's collegial partnership admis-sions process is a private sector analogue to a legislatu·re; if anything, petitioner's system is even more amorphous, since there are no quantitative standards governing the number of votes needed for approval or rejection of a candidacy by the Policy Board. 
The Court has also made clear that the question whether discrimination affected a decision is typically resolved on an up-or-down basis. This is because "[d] is-criminatory intent is simply not amenable to calibration. It is either a factor that has influenced the ... choice or it is not." Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 277 ( 1979). 
Proof of invidious intent may take a "variety of forms," Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 
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( 1978), including proof of sexual stereotyping. City of 
Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v. Manhart, 
435 U.S. 702 (1978); see also Fadhl v. City & County of 
San Francisco, 741 F.2d at 1165. When a plaintiff uses 
any of these forms to show that discrimination has con-
tributed to an employment decision, a violation of Title 
VII is established, whether or not lawful motives are also 
present. 
2. Once a violation of the Act is proved, the defendant 
has the opportunity under Section 706 (g), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-5 (g), to seek to limit specific relief-i.e., hiring, 
reinstatement, promotion or back pay-by proving that 
the same decision would have been made in the absence 
of discrimination. Contrary to petitioner's contention, 
this is unquestionably the employer's burden because such 
evidence goes to remedy, not to liability. International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 
(1977). This burden shifting is appropriate because, as 
the Court has held under the NLRA, "[t]he employer is 
a wrongdoer ... It is fair that he bear the risk that the 
influence of legal and illegal motives cannot be separated, 
because he knowingly created the risk ... " Transporta-
tion Management Corp., 462 U.S. at 403. 
The defendant's burden of limiting relief must be dis-
charged by clear and convincing evidence. This is a 
standard which concerns the clarity and objectivity of the 
employer's proof as much as its weight. Significant pub-
lic interests are at stake in Title VII cases, especially 
after a violation of the Act has been established, and a 
higher standard of proof applies where the issue is the 
amount of relief due from a proven wrongdoer. Story 
Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 
U.S. 555 (1931). Use of that approach is warranted here, 
because the "broad and insistent purposes [of Title VII] 
dictate that the employer be held to a strict showing, once 
discrimination has been established." Day v. Mathews, 
530 F.2d 1083, 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1976). It is instructive 
that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the 
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agency charged with enforcing Title VII, applies the 
clear and convincing standard in the Federal sector, where the Commission has binding regulatory authority. 
29 C.F.R. § 1613.271. 
3. Ann Hopkins proved a violation of Title VII in this 
case. As the Solicitor General acknowledges, there is suf-
ficient evidence in the record to support a finding that the rejection of Hopkins' candidacy "was caused, at least 
in part, by an impermissible motive" (Brief for United 
States 27). The Solicitor General's reservation is simply that the district court did not make the necessary causal 
finding; hence he suggests a remand. 
The district court's decision makes clear, however, that 
the court focused on causation. Price Waterhouse main-
tained a partnership admissions process that gave special 
weight to negative views. These views, especially from 
partners who did not know Hopkins well, were decisive 
( "those who had less than full time involvement with 
Ann, were in effect the deciders on this one"; see n.2, 
supra). The negative views were "influenced by sex stereotypes" (Pet. App. 58a). (As to this point, the gov-
ernment found especially instructive Thomas Beyer's ad-
vice to Hopkins to behave "more femininely," since Beyer 
was speaking for the Policy Board; Brief for United States 27). And finally, Price Waterhouse knew what 
was happening: "the maintenance of a system that gave weight to ... biased criticisms was a conscious act of the 
partnership as a whole" ( Pet. App. 56a) . 
In short, petitioner knowingly accorded special weight 
to negative views about Hopkins influenced by sex stereo-
types and made no effort to discourage or discount such 
views. Hence the district court found that Hopkins had proved that "denial of partnership in her specific situa-
tion was caused, in part," by petitioner's knowing failure 
to deal with discriminatory evaluations of her qualifica-
tions (Pet. App. 62a; emphasis supplied). 
The district court's findings are a proper predicate for 
its determination that Title VII was violated. At a min-
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imum, the partnership admissions system described 
in the court's findings-a system that "gave weight to 
. . . biased criticisms" ( Pet. App. 56a )-"tend [ ed] to 
deprive" Hopkins of opportunities for advancement be-
cause of her sex in violation of the Act. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2 (a) (2). This is sufficient to establish a viola-
tion and to affirm the decisions below. 
ARGUMENT 
I. A VIOLATION OF TITLE VII IS ESTABLISHED IF 
THE PLAINT'IFF PROVES THAT AN EMPLOY-
MENT DECISION WAS CAUSED, IN PART, BY 
DISCRIMINATION. THIS BURDEN MAY BE SAT-
ISFIED BY SHOWING THAT DISCRIMINATION 
"TENDED TO DEPRIVE" THE PLAINTIFF OF 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES. 
Title VII's "central statutory purposes" are clear. The 
Act is aimed at "eradicating discrimination throughout 
the economy and making persons whole for injuries suf-
fered through past discrimination." Albemarle Paper Co. 
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975). Congress imple-
mented these purposes by creating in Section 703 of Title 
VII a series of unlawful employment practices aimed at 
employers, employment agencies, labor organizations and 
joint labor-management training programs. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2 (a) - ( d) . The prohibitions on employer conduct 
are set forth in two provisions in Section 703 (a), 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a). Both alone and in concert, these 
constraints sweep broadly. 
Section 703 (a) ( 1) makes it unlawful for an employer 
to "fail or refuse to hire or to discharge . . . or otherwise 
to discriminate against any individual with respect to 
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex or national origin." Under Section 703 (a) (2), 
it is also unlawful for an employer "to limit, segregate, 
or classify his employees . . . in any way which would 





opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee because of" an impermissible reason ( em-phasis supplied). 
Petitioner's principal contention in this case is that there can be no violation of Title VII unless the plaintiff has proved that unlawful discrimination was the "deci-sive factor" in a decision: "if the employment decision would have been identical even where discriminatory mo-tives and expressions are wholly absent[,] there can be no violation" of the Act (Brief for Petitioner 23). 
But on its face neither Section 703 (a) (1) nor (2) limits an unlawful employment practice to the situation in which an impermissible motive is the sole or the dom-inant reason for the employer's action. On the contrary, both simply refer to conduct that occurred "because of" race, sex, etc. And here it is quite significant that both houses of Congress, when debating what eventually be-came Title VII, expressly rejected an amendment provid-ing that a violation would arise only if an employment decision was made "solely because of" an unlawful mo-tive. See 110 Cong. Rec. H2728, S13838 (1964) .9 
In addition, under Section 703 ( a) ( 2) an employer may not limit his employees in any way that would "deprive or tend to deprive" them of employment opportunities because of a criterion such as race or sex. The empha-
9 In opposing this provision, Senator Case, the Republican floor manager of Title VII, stated: 
The difficulty with this amendment is that it would render title VII totally nugatory. If anyone ever had an action that was motivated by a single cause, he is a different kind of animal from any I know of. But beyond that difficulty, this amendment would place upon persons attempting to prove a violation of this section, no matter how clear the violation was, an obstacle so great as to make the title completely worthless. 
110 Cong. Rec. Sl3837 (1964). Moreover, Senator Humphrey, the Democratic floor leader, said that the bill makes "it an illegal practice to use race as a factor in denying employment." Id. at Si3088 (emphasis supplied). 
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sized language plainly reaches the mixed motive case, 
since it is the very presence of a lawful motive that may 
make it difficult to ascertain whetJher unlawful discrim-
ination alone worked the deprivation. Often the most 
that can be said in such situations is that the proven 
discrimination "tends to deprive" an individual of job 
opportunities; yet the statutory text is clear that liability 
attaches if this degree of causation is established. This 
broad approach to violation is unsurprising, given the 
Congressional objective of "eradicating discrimination 
throughout the economy." Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 
422 U.S. at 421.10 
Congress reaffirmed this objective in 1972 when Title 
VII was amended to extend its coverage to agencies of 
the Federal government. As this Court has observed, 
the purpose of this extension was to subject the Federal 
sector to the same substantive provisions of Title VII 
that already governed private employers: "In general, 
it may be said that the substantive anti-discrimination 
law embraced in Title VII was carried over and applied 
to the FederaJ Government." Morton v. Mancari, 417 
U.S. at 547; see Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 
841 ( 1976). Hence it is significant that Congress, in 
applying the private standard to Federal agencies, spe-
cified that "all personnel actions affecting [Federal em-
ployees] ... shall be made free from any discrimination 
based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin." 
42 U.S.C. §2000e-16(a) (emphasis supplied). It is ciear 
that an employment decision based in part on discrim-
ination would run afoul of this provision. 
The vast majority of Title VII cases are susceptible 
to binary analysis; i.e., the question is whether prohibited 
10 Although we agree with much of the Solicitor General's ap-
proach in this case, the government fails to address Section 703 
(a) (2) and to give the statutory language its full intended effect. 
Analogies to the common law may be helpful, but they do not pro-
vide a complete answer. This is not a common law case, and the 
starting point must be analysis of the statutory text. American 




discrimination either was-or was not-the cause of a 
challenged employment decision. The defendant typically 
offers a legitimate explanation to justify its action, and 
usually the decision was made by one actor, such as a 
foreman or other supervisor, perhaps with concurrence by 
one or two others. Finally, there is often little or no 
direct evidence of discrimination, such as an epithet or 
other overt betrayal of bias. 
It is the common case that is most amenable to the 
analytical framework created in McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and Texas Depart-
ment of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 
(1981). The approach developed in these cases focuses 
attention on the employer's explanation for a challenged 
decision and permits use of circumstantial evidence to 
prove liability. Ultimately "the district court must de-
cide which party's explanation of the employer's motiva-
tion it believes." United States Postal Service Board of 
Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983). If the 
employer's rationale is discredited, then the plaintiff nor-
mally prevails, for the inference drawn is that the dis-
credited motive was a pretext for discrimination. 
Contrary to petitioner's insistence, however, this Court 
has recognized that the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine 
framework is not the exclusive means of proving dis-
crimination. Thus, in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. 
Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 ( 1985), the Court rejected 
the assertion that plaintiffs who had produced direct 
evidence of discrimination had failed to establish lia-
bility because they had not made out a prima facie 
case under McDonnell Douglas: "This argument fails, 
for the McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the 
,plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination." And 
the Court has also noted that Burdine is "inapposite" 
where a plaintiff has carried the burden of proving that 
an employment decision was taken, "at least in part," for 
unl::iwful reasons, because " [ t] he Court [in Burdine] 
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discussed only the situation in which the issue is whether 
illegal or legal motives, but not both, were the 'true' 
motives behind the decision." Transportation Manage-
ment Corp., 462 U.S. at 400 n.5. 
The Court has further emphasized that, once a case 
has been tried, preoccupation with the allocation of bur-
dens specified in McDonnell Douglas and Burdine is mis-
placed and may obscure the central issue: " ' [whether] 
the defendant intentionally discriminated against the 
plaintiff.' " United States Postal Service Board of Gov-
erno1·s v. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 715 ( citation omitted). 
In short, the McDonnell Douglas/ Burdine framework is 
often useful but does not answer every question of proof 
posed in Title VII litigation. In particular, it does not 
address the situation where, after all the evidence is in, 
the trier of fact concludes-as the district court did 
here-that an employment "decision is a mixture of legit-
imate and discriminatory considerations" (Pet. App. 
59a). 
This is not to suggest that there are qualitative dif-
ferences between the plaintiff's burden of proof in the 
single-motive cases most characteristic of Burdine and 
those cases in which a court finds mixed motivation. 
There are not. In all Title VII litigation, Burdin.e's· basic 
underlying principle governs: "The ultimate burden of 
persuading the trier of fact that the defendant inten-
tionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at 
all times with the plaintiff." 450 U.S. at 253. Of course, 
the same principle applies in unfair labor practice cases 
under the National Labor Relations Act. See Transpor-
tation Management Corp., where the Court emphasized 
that "throughout the proceedings, the General Counsel 
[of the NLRB] carries the burden of proving the ele-
ments of an unfair labor practice." 462 U.S. at 401. 
The question is not whether the plaintiff retains the 
burden of proving a violation but rather what satisfies 
that burden. Thus in Transportation Management Corp. 






ployee was fired "at least in part" because of anti-union 
animus. See 462 U.S. at 400 n.5. Yet once this burden 
was carried, the Court saw nothing inconsistent in the 
Labor Board's permitting an employer who wished to 
escape a violation adjudication-the functional equiva-
lent of a liability determination under Title VII-to 
prove as an affirmative defense that the employee would 
have been fired even absent an unlawful motive.11 
As this Court has observed, Title VII was modeled in 
key respects on the National Labor Relations Act. 
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 
769 (1976). And in Transportation Management Corp. 
the Court sanctioned approaches to liability and relief 
under that Act that are similar to those employed below 
and by other Federal courts in Title VII cases. More-
over, the Court expressly rejected the argument-iden-
tical in form to that made by petitioner here-that the 
General Counsel of the Board "had the burden of show-
ing not only that a forbidden motivation contributed to 
the discharge but also that the discharge would not have 
taken place independently of the protected conduct of the 
employee." 462 U.S. at 400-401 ( emphasis supplied). 
Petitioner's position would, in Senator Cases's words, 
"render Title VII totally nugatory." 110 Cong. Rec. 
S13837 (1964) (seen. 9, supra). In recognition of this, 
the District of Columbia Circuit holds that, once a plain-
tiff proves that discrimination was applied against him 
with respect to a specific employment decision, "it is un-
reasonable and destructive of the purposes of Title VII 
to require the plaintiff to establish in addition the difficult 
hypothetical proposition that, had there been no discrimi-
nation, the employment decision would have been made in 
his favor." Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d at 1366. In similar 
11 The Court observed further that " [ w] e also assume that the 
Board might have considered a showing by the employer that the 
adverse action would have occurred in any event as not obviating 
a violation adjudication but as going only to the permissible remedy, 
in which event the burden of proof could surely have been put on 
the employer." Id. at 402 (emphasis supplied). 
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fashion, the Ninth Circuit has rejected the contention that 
an employer is not liable under Title VII unless the plain-
tiff can prove that she "would have been employed but for 
sex discrimination," saying that " [ t] his contention con-
fuses the separate issues of threshold liability and ap-
propriate relief." Fadhl v. City & County of San Fran-
cisco, 741 F.2d at 1165. That court held that, "[w]hen 
an employer's discriminatory treatment consists of a 
failure to consider an applicant's qualifications, or in 
the use of evaluative criteria that are discriminatory, the 
applicant need not prove that he or she was qualified to 
fill the position in order to obtain some relief." Id. at 
1165-66 (emphasis supplied). 
In Transportation Management Corp., the Court was 
sanctioning the Labor Board's approach to liability, rather 
than enunciating a test in the first instance. But the 
Court observed that the Board had borrowed heavily 
from what the Court itself had done in Mt. Healthy City 
Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, where 
we held that the plaintiff had to show that the em-
ployer's disapproval of his First Amendment pro-
tected expression played a role in the employer's de-
cision to discharge him. If that burden of persuasion 
were carried, the burden would be on the defendant 
to show by a p•reponderance of the evidence that he 
would have reached the same decision even if hypo-
thetically, he had not been motivated by a desire to 
punish plaintiff for exercising his First Amendment 
rights. 
462 U.S. at 403 (emphasis supplied). 
The Court has used varying formulations to describe 
the plaintiff's burden in the mixed motive setting, but 
the message has remained constant. Thus the Court has 
spoken of the need for a plaintiff to prove that an im-
permissible criterion was a "substantial factor" or a 
"motivating factor" in a challenged decision, Mt. Healthy, 
429 U.S. at 287; Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro-
politan Ho,using Development Corp., 429 U.S. at 270-71 
n.21, or that it "contributed to" the decision. Transporta-
J ,, 
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tion Management Corp., 462 U.S. at 400-401. Also in Transportation Management Corp., the Court said that in Mt. Healthy "we held that the plaintiff had to show that [an impermissible motive] played a role in the em-ployer's decision to discharge him." 462 U.S. at 403 ( emphasis supplied) . 
In none of these cases did the Court hold that a plain-tiff must prove that an unlawful factor was the sole or dominant cause of a challenged action, or that the result would have been different in the absence of discrimina-tion. On the contrary, in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282 n.10 (1976), the Court rejected the notion that "the Title VII plaintiff must show that he would have in any event been rejected or discharged solely on the basis of his race, without regard to the alleged deficiencies ... " This was dicta, as was the proviso that "no more is required to be shown than that race was a 'but for' cause," id., but the passage rejects an overly rigid approach to causation under Title VII and indicates that liability is fixed in a mixed motive case by proof that one of the motives was unlawful. 
The same is true even where legislative or executive action is challenged as unconstitutional because it is based on discrimination: 
[Washington v.] Davis [ 426 U.S. 229] does not require a plaintiff to prove that the challenged action rested solely on racially discriminatory purposes. Rarely can it be said that a legislature or adminis-trative body operating under a broad mandate made a decision motivated solely by a single concern, or even that a particular purpose was the "dominant" or "primary" one. 
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265. 
Arlington Heights is important not only because it shows that a discriminatory purpose need not be "domi-nant" or "primary" to trigger a violation. Also signifi-cant is its recognition that collegial decisions are espe-cially likely to result from a mixture of motivations. And it is doubtful that there exists in the private sector a 
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more broadly based, collegial decisionmaking process-or 
one with more amorphous criteria-than that employed 
by Price Waterhouse to assess candidates for partner-
ship. 
The Court's treatment of Washington v. Davis in 
Arlington Heights merits special attention. Davis was 
an employment discrimination case brought under the 
Fifth Amendment, and the Court there declined to hold 
public employers defending constitutional claims to Title 
VII's higher standards. 426 U.S. at 247-48. Yet under 
Davis (as the cited passage from Arlington Heights 
makes clear), liability for an EEO violation under the 
Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments is established even if 
a discriminatory purpose is not "dominant" or "primary." 
It turns Davis on its head to argue-as petitioner neces-
sarily must-that more is needed to prove a violation 
under Title VII than under the Constitution. 
The Court has recognized that causation, especially in 
the context of discrimination, is not susceptible to precise 
mathematical formulation. Often the most that a trier of 
fact can do is to determine whether or not discrimination 
affected a result. What the Court said about this in 
assessing a legislature's motivation is equally applicable 
here: 
Invidious discrimination does not became less so be-
cause the discrimination accomplished is of a lesser 
magnitude. Discriminatory intent is simply not 
amenable to calibration. It either is a factor that 
has influenced the legislative choice or it is not. 
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 
U.S. at 277 (footnote omitted). 
The Solicitor General aspires to a degree of precision 
that is frequently unattainable. Thus the government 
posits a situation in which four negative votes may be 
sufficient to deny admission to partnership and says that 
discriminatory cause will be established if, e.g., (1) a 
woman receives five negative votes, of which two are dis-
criminatory, or (2) a woman receives four negative dis-
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criminatory votes and five negative legitimate votes 
(Brief for United States 14). We have no quarrel with 
this analysis in principle, but it cannot resolve this case or many others. Price Waterhouse did not set a fixed 
number of negative votes or comments that would dis-
qualify a candidacy, and intensity of opposition-which cannot be measured by up or down votes-was an im-
portant element in the process. ( One of the striking 
things about this case-and a key indicator that some-
thing was amiss-was the in tense opposition voiced 
toward Ann Hopkins by a few men from other offices who 
barely knew her; see pp. 9-10, supra). Moreover, charac-
terizing individual votes as either discriminatory or legiti-
mate may itself be artificial and, among other things, 
fails to account for the influence that a particular partner or legislator motivated by bias may have on more fair-
minded colleagues. Given these factors, all that can honestly be said by a trier of fact who, having heard the 
evidence, believes that discrimination affected a collegial 
decision is something very much like what the district 
court found here: "stereotyping played an undefined role 
in blocking plaintiff's admission to the partnership .... " 
( Pet. App. 54a) .12 
Of course, Title VII penalizes actions, not thoughts; 
hence the Act's prohibtions are directed at conduct, at "employment practice[s]," 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a) (em-
phasis supplied). But this case is not about "thought con-
trol" or "discrimination in the air." While petitioner 
suggests that any discrimination in this case was insig-
12 As noted above (p. 11), the district court did not rest on this alone. Since the stereotyping by individual partners may have been unconscious, the court believed that an additional element was needed to establish liability for intentional discrimination; this was the fact that "the maintenance of a system that gave weight to such biased criticisms [of Hopkins] was a conscious act of the partnership as a whole" (Pet. App. 56a). This focus on the action of the employer "as a· whole," as opposed to its agents, may have been overly cautious (see Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)) and if anything gave the benefit of the doubt to peti-tioner. 
, 
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nificant or de minimis, the courts below found otherwise. 
Indeed, the district court expressly rejected judicial in-
volvement in insignificant matters and said that courts 
were not responsible for "polic[ing] every instance where 
subjective judgment may be tainted by unarticulated, un-
conscious assumptions related to sex" (Pet. App. 55a). 
But that was not the situation here. Instead Price Water-
house knowingly maintained a partnership admissions 
system in which negative views-views influenced by sex 
discrimination-were accorded disproportionate weight in 
the decision on Hopkins (Pet. App. 58a). The opinions 
below make it clear that Hopkins suffered not because of 
discrimination in the air but rather because of discrimina-
tion brought to ground and visited upon her.13 
Proof of discrimination may take a "variety of forms." 
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. at 578. 
This includes evidence of sexual stereotyping, as "[i] t is 
now well recognized that employment decisions cannot be 
predicated on mere 'stereotyped' impressions about the 
characteristics of males or females." City of Los Angeles 
Department of Wa.ter & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 
707. See also Fadhl v. City & County of San Francisco, 
741 F.2d at 1165.14 Where a trier of fact finds-on the 
13 Contrary to petitioner's assertion (Brief for Petitioner 20), 
the evidentiary support for the finding of discrimination was not 
limited to the expert testimony on stereotyping. Both the courts 
below and the Solicitor General were particularly impressed with 
the advice Thomas Beyer gave Hopkins to behave more femininely 
(see Brief for United States 27). The testimony of the expert 
was, however, consistent with this and other evidence of discrimina-
tion.. As this Court has held, "plaintiffs should be given the full 
benefit of their proof without tightly compartmentalizing the 
various factual components and wiping the slate clean after scrutiny 
of each." Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 
699 (1962). 
14 Fadhl and the present case vividly illustrate the "double bind" 
that afflicts victims of stereotyping. In Fadhl the plaintiff was 
criticized for behaving "too much like a woman," 741 F.2d at 1165, 
while here Hopkins was told to behave "more femininely." Where 
stereotyping is at work, a woman is "damned if she does and 
31 
basis of words, conduct or any of the "variety of forms" which evidence of bias may take-that discrimination af-fected an employment decision, a violation of Title VII is established?5 
II. ONCE A VIOLATION HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED, THE EMPLOYER MAY LIMIT RELIEF BY PROV-ING THAT THE SAME DECISION WOULD HAVE BEEN MADE ABSENT DISCRIMINATION. 
A. The Employer Has the Burden of Proving that Relief Should Be Limited. 
Once a violation has been established, the inquiry turns to appropriate relief. Title VII's remedial provisions are set forth in Section 706 (g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (g). See Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. at 762. Under that section, specific relief-Le., hiring, reinstate-ment, promotion or back pay-may not be decreed if the challenged decision was made "for any reason other" than prohibited discrimination. This permits the employer to limit the remedy upon a proper showing. But Section 
damned if she doesn't." See J.A. 46 (testimony of Dr. Fiske); see also Prather, Why Can't Women Be More Like Men: A Summary of the Sociopsychological Factors Hindering Women's Advancement in the Professions, 15 American Behavioral Scientist 172 (1971). 
,15 Petitioner raises the specter of plaintiffs alleging mixed moti-vation in order to take advantage of what is erroneously said to be a more lenient standard of proof. This is specious. First, as we have shown, the plaintiff's burden of proof is the same in all Title VII cases. Second, as the Solicitor General points out, defendants are usually responsible for suggesting "multiplicity of motives" (Brief for United States 12). Third, a plaintiff will always have an interest in proving, if possible, that discrimination was the sole cause of a challenged action, since the existence of an independent legitimate cause may result in a limitation on relief (see Section II, infra). Fourth, and most significant, a case becomes one of mixed motivation not because a plaintiff or defendant characterizes it that way-but rather because the trier of fact determines that both lawful and unlawful motives contributed to an employment decision. See NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393. 
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706 (g) does not deal with violation. On the contrary, 
this provision is not even triggered unless the court first 
"finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in 
... an unlawful employment practice .... " 16 
The relationship between Section 703 (a), which defines 
violation, and the remedy provisions of Section 706 (g) is 
well illustrated by early Title VII cases challenging job 
segregation. Maintenance of racially segregated jobs (or 
lines of progression) is unlawful, because it tends to 
deprive blacks of employment opportunities. Hence there 
is a violation of Section 703 (a) (2). But specific relief 
will not be awarded to a particular black worker if the 
employer can prove that the employee would not have 
advanced in any event because of legitimate reasons. See, 
e.g., Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 
1364, 1380 (5th Cir. 1974) ("appropriate to require the 
employer to show that its invidious limitations on free 
mobility were not the cause of the discriminatee's current 
position on the economic ladder") .17 
The Court adopted the distinction between liability and 
specific relief in International Brotherhood of Teamsters 
v. United States, 431 U.S. at 361: "the question of indi-
vidual relief does not arise until it has been proved that 
the employer has followed an employment policy of un-
lawful discrimination." At that point, once it is shown 
that a particular employee sought a job, "the burden 
16 While the Court has sometimes debated the meaning of Section 
706(g)-particularly whether it permits a remedy for individuals 
who were not themselves victims of discrimination-there has been 
no dispute that this provision is aimed at relief. E.g., Local 28, 
Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986); Firefighters 
Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984). 
,17 It was also in the early job segregation cases that the courts 
first held that relief under Title VII would be denied only if the 
employer proves by "clear and convincing evidence" that legitimate 
reasons justified its treatment of an employee. E.g., Baxter v. 
Savannah Sugar Refining Corp., 495 F.2d 437, 445 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1033 (1974); Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber Co., 491 F.2d at 1380. (See Section II.B, infra.) 
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then rests on the employer to demonstrate that the indi-vidual applicant was denied an employment opportunity for lawful reasons." Id. at 362. See Franks v. Bowman, Transportation Co., 424 U.S. at 773 n.32 ("[n]o reason appears ... why the victim rather than the perpetrator of the illegal act should bear the burden of proof" on a remedial issue) . 18 
The point is that this Court and the lower courts have long recognized that an employer properly adjudged guilty of violating Title VII may still conceivably have a valid, independent reason for the challenged action. But the burden of limiting relief is on the employer. 
The Court in Transportation Management Corp. ex-plained the rationale for placing the burden of proof on the employer after the plaintiff has proved that an un-lawful motive contributed to a decision: 
The employer is a wrongdoer; he has acted out of a motive that is declared illegitimate by the statute. It is fair that he bear the risk that the influence of legal and illegal motives cannot be separated, because he knowingly created the risk and because the risk was created not by innocent activity but by his own wrongdoing. 
462 U.S. at 403. 
The NLRB shifts the burden or proof at the liability stage, thereby giving the employer a chance to avoid a violation adjudication-the equivalent of a liability de-termination in court-by proving that the same decision would have been made if the unlawful motive had not been present. The Court in Transportation Management 
JS The Court recognized the same principle in another Title VII case, East Texas Motor Freight System Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 n.9 (1977) ("[e]ven assuming, arguendo, that the com-pany's failure even to consider the applications was discriminatory, the company was entitled to prove at trial that the respondents had not been injured because they were not qualified and would not have been hired in any event"). See also Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 270 n.21. 
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Corp. sanctioned this approach but also said that the 
Board could properly have treated such evidence "as 
going only to the permissible remedy, in which event the 
burden of proof could surely have been put on the em-
ployer." 462 U.S. at 402. Whether this shift is said to 
occur in connection with liability or relief, however, it 
has exactly the same trigger-a finding by the trier of 
fact that the plaintiff has carried the burden of proving 
that an unlawful motive affected the employment decision. 
ld.10 
Under Title VII, this particular burden of proof prop-
erly shifts at the remedy stage after a violation has been 
established, as is evident from the text of Section 706 (g), 
the controlling statutory provision. This section does not 
even come into play until the court has found that the 
employer "intentionally engaged in ... an unlawful em-
ployment practice," and the most such an employer can do 
under Section 706 (g) is to avoid certain specific remedies 
by proving that the challenged decision was made "for any 
reason other" than discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5 (g). As the Solicitor General observes, other general 
relief remains available, such as an injunction against 
future discrimination and attorneys' fees (Brief for 
United States 23). 
Injunctive relief may be crucial. Suppose, for example, 
that a black worker proves that an employer maintains 
racially segregated jobs, but the employer is able to show 
that the employee lacked qualifications for a "white" job. 
If such proof enabled the employer to escape liability 
altogether, it would be free to maintain the same segre-
gated system in the future. This would be anomalous 
under a statute aimed at "eradicating discrimination 
throughout the economy," Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 
19 References to the liability or relief "stages" of a Title VII 
case do not necessarily mean that there will be separate hearings 
on violation and remedy. In most individual cases, all evidence 
will be presented in one trial, but the issues of liability and relief 
remain analytically distinct. 
-- ------
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422 U.S. at 421, and it is not what Section 706 (g) 
envisions. Instead the employer's proof enables it only to 
avoid promoting the black worker and giving him back 
pay; the employer remains liable for a violation of Title 
VII and may be enjoined from maintaining the segre-
gated system. Under Section 706 (g), the burden of proof 
shifts to the employer at the relief stage of a Title VII 
case, after a violation of the Act has been established.:20 
Finally, it would be confusing doctrinally to have dif-
ferent rules governing burden shifting depending on 
whether the trier of fact determines that one or more 
than one motive contributed to an employment decision. 
In all Title VII cases, the plaintiff has the burden of 
proving a violation of the Act. In all cases-whether 
20 The court of appeals below appeared to treat this burden as 
shifting in connection with the liability determination (Pet. App. 
25a; see p. 13, supra). Some courts. have done the same, e.g., 
Blalock v. Metals Trades, Inc., 775 F .2d 703, 713 ( 6th Cir. 1985), 
while others have held that the burden of proof shifts in connec-
tion with a determination of remedy, e.g., Fields v. Clark University, 
817 F.2d 931, 936-37 (1st Cir. 1987); Caviale v. Wisconsin Depart-
ment of Health & Social Services, 744 F.2d 1289, 1296 (7th Cir. 
1984); Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1323-24 (8th Cir. 1985) 
(en bane) ; Fadhl v. City & County of San Francisco, 741 F.2d at 
1166-67. In Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 875-76 (11th Cir. 
1985), the court held that the burden of proof shifted to the em-
ployer where direct evidence of discrimination was "accepted by 
the trier of fact" (id. at 875) but did not specify whether the shift 
occurred in connection with liability or relief. 
We believe that the court of appeals below was incorrect in shift-
ing the burden at the liability stage, but this was not harmful to 
petitioner. As we have shown, whether the shift is said to occur 
in connection with violation or remedy, it has the same trigger-
i.e., proof accepted by the trier of fact that an unlawful motive 
affected the employment decision. See Transportation Management 
Corp., 462 U.S. at 402. Given this, shifting the burden at the 
liability stage benefits the employer by giving it the opportunity to 
escape all consequences of a Title VII violation. Thus petitioner 
cannot complain about this aspect of the decision of the court of 
appeals. (The district court properly shifted the burden in con-
nection with remedy, after it had found a violation of Title VII; 
Pet. App. 59a.) 
I I 
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involving a single or several motives-this burden is satis-
fied by proof that discrimination affected the challenged 
decision. And the employer always retains the oppor-
tunity to try to limit relief after the violation has been 
established.21 
B. The Employer's Burden of Limiting Relief Must Be 
Discharged by Clear and Convincing Evidence. 
Following a determination of a violation of Title VII, 
the plaintiff is entitled to at least "some relief." Fadhl 
V. City & Cownty of San Francisco, 741 F.2d at 1166. 
As we have shown, however, the employer may limit 
specific relief upon a proper showing. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5 (g). In the District of Columbia Circuit, this showing 
must be made by clear and convincing evidence. Day v. 
Mathews, 530 F.2d at 1085; Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d 
at 1366.22 
Preponderance of the evidence is the customary stand-
ard in civil litigation, but the clear and convincing ap-
proach "is no stranger to the civil law," Woodby v. INS, 
385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966), and has been employed where 
the "interests at stake . . . are deemed to be more sub-
stantial than mere loss of money," Addington v. Texas, 
441 U.S. 418, 424 ( 1979). Thus this Court has required 
the party with the burden of proof to satisfy the clear 
21 See Blalock v. Metals Trades, Inc., 775 F.2d at 712, in which 
the court could "discern no meaningful difference" between the 
plaintiff's burden to prove that an unlawful criterion was a "mo-
tivating factor" under Mt. Healthy or to prove under Burdine that 
an employment decision was "more likely than not motivated" by 
such a criterion. In the typical Burdine type case, it would be 
unusual, of course, for the employer to offer a second justification 
for its actions at the remedy stage. 
22 The Fifth and Ninth Circuits use the same standard, e.g., 
Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Refining Corp., 495 F.2d at 445 (5th 
Cir.); Nanty v. Barrows Co., 660 F.2d 1327, 1333 (9th Cir. 1981), 
while other courts speak of preponderant evidence, e.g., Fields v. 
Clark University, 817 F.2d at 937 (1st Cir.); Bibbs v. Block, 778 
F.2d at 1324 n.5 (8th Cir.); Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d at 875-
76 (11th Cir.). 
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and convincing test in cases involving termination of parental rights,23 civil commitment,24 defamation,3'5 de-portation 126 and denaturalization.127 
Petitioner argues that these cases applied the clear and convincing standard to p"laintijjs and says that the test should not be applied to a defendant. This is simplistic at best. The issue is not the party's label but whether it has properly been assigned the burden of persuasion on a particular issue. And assuming the burden is properly assigned, the next question is the type of evidence that will satisfy the burden. 
The employer bears the burden of limiting relief under Title VII. And this Court has long recognized that a different standard of proof may apply where the issue is the amount of relief due from a proven wrongdoer. Thus there is a "clear distinction between the measure of proof necessary to establish t11e fact that petitioner had sustained some damage and the measure of proof neces-sary to enable the jury to fix the amount." Story Parch-ment Co. v. Patterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. at 562. This is because "[t] he most elementary concep-tions of justice and public policy require that the wrong-doer shall bear the risk of the uncertainty which his own wrong has created." Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 265 ( 1946). 
It was on the basis of decisions such as Story Parch-ment that the Fifth Circuit held under the National Labor Relations Act that "any doubts about entitlement 
23 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982). 24 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. at 432-33. 25 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 (1971). 26 Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. at 286. 
27 Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 123-25, 158 
(1943). As Schneiderman shows, id. at 123, the Court's primary 
concern was not that the quantum of proof be higher but that there 
be "evidence of a clear and convincing character" ( emphasis. sup-
plied). See n.28, infra, and accompanying text. 
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to back pay should be resolved against the employer." 
See Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d at 
1380. This approach was then incorporated into Title 
VII, so that if an employer wishes to show in . connection 
with relief that a black worker 
would not be qualified for any other job[,] then its 
proof must be clear and convincing. Any doubts •in 
proof should be resolved in favor of the discriminatee 
giving full and adequate consideration to equitable 
principles. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
It is evident that the concern here is as much with the 
quality as the quantity of the employer's proof. General-
ized testimonial assertions will not suffice to limit the 
remedy; instead evidence is needed that is persuasive in 
its own right, e.g., proof that an employee did not meet 
objective, job related standards that had been consistently 
applied to others. See: Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Refin,-
ing Corp., 495 F.2d at 444.28 
Concurring in Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d at 1373, Judge 
Tamm observed that a "higher standard of proof is justi-
fied by the consideration that the employer is a wrong-
doer whose unlawful conduct has made it difficult for 
the plaintiff to show what would have occurred in the 
absence of that conduct." Consistent with this approach, 
the district court below held that, " [ w] here sex discrim-
ination is present, even if a promotion decision is a mix-
ture of legitimate and discriminatory considerations, un-
certainties must be resolved against the employer" ( Pet. 
App. 59a). This, of course, recalls the principle in labor 
28 This approach was foreshadowed in school desegregation cases 
where courts required school boards seeking to dismiss black 
teachers to justify their position by clear and convincing evidence, 
which meant that the black educators had to be considered "objec-
tively in comparison with all teachers." Wall v. Stanly County 
Board of Education, 378 F.2d 275, 278 (4th Cir. 1967) (emphasis 
in original). See Rolfe v. Lincoln County Board of Education, 
391 F.2d 77, 80 (6th Cir. 1968). 
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as well as tort law that it rests upon the wrongdoer "to 
disentangle the consequences for which it was chargeable 
from those from which it was immune." NLRB v. Rem-
ington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862, 872 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 304 U.S. 576 ( 1938), quoted in Transportation 
Mariagement Corp., 462 U.S. at 399 n.4. 
Once a violation of Title VII has been established, the 
strong presumption is that the plaintiff is entitled to full 
relief. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 
421. The District of Columbia Circuit has relied in part 
on Moody in explaining why an employer wishing to 
avoid specific relief must produce clear and convincing 
proof, saying that 
[t]he reason for this is straightforward. "Un-
questionably, it is now impossible for an individual 
discriminatee to recreate the past with exactitude." 
* * * Such a showing is impossible precisely because 
of the employer's unlawful action; it is only equit-
able that any resulting uncertainty be resolved 
against the party whose action gave rise to the 
problem. Thus, once discrimination is shown, relief 
should not be narrowly denied. Moreover, the Su-
preme Court has recently emphasized that the pur-
pose of Title VII is to "eradicat[e] discrimination 
throughout the economy and [to make] persons 
whole for injuries suffered through past discrimina-
tion." Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, ... 422 U.S. 
at 421 .... The Court stressed: "It is the reason-
ably certain prospect of a backpay award that 'pro-
vide [s] the spur or catalyst which causes employers 
and unions to self-examine and to self-evaluate their 
employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, 
so far as possible, the last vestiges of an unfortunate 
and ignominious page in this country's history.'" Id. 
at 417-418. * * * These broad and insistent purposes 
dictate that the employer be held to a strict showing, 
once discrimination has been established. 
Day v. Mathews, 530 F.2d at 1086 (emphasis supplied; 
footnote and some citations omitted). 
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A Title VII case, particularly one in which a violation 
has been established, is freighted with the public interest. 
The twin Congressional purposes of "eradicating discrim-
ination" and "making persons whole" mean that, at this 
juncture of the litigation, the interests at stake transcend 
those of private parties and are "more substantial than 
mere loss of money." Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. at 
424. This is just the type of situation in which this 
Court has applied the clear and convincing standard. 
In Mt. Healthy, where the burden of proof was shifted 
to the defendant in a First Amendment setting, the Court 
stated that the burden would be satisfied by preponderant 
evidence, although there was no discussion of this point. 
429 U.S. at 287.29 But the Court has also held that 
employers face more stringent standards under Title VII 
than in EEO cases arising under the Constitution. 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 247-48 (see p. 28, 
supra). 
There is reason for this. Title VII was designed to be 
remedial and was "directed at a historic evil of national 
proportions." Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 
at 416. Hence a court must exercise its remedial powers 
" 'in light of the large objectives of the Act.'" Id., quot-
ing Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 331 (1944). The 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, of which Title VII is a vital 
component, remains the single most important piece of 
social legislation enacted by Congress in the post-war era. 
Tihe Act has played a major role in permitting this na-
tion to adjust relations between the races ( and between 
men and women) in a largely peaceful fashion. As the 
court in Day v. Mathews recognized, the objectives of 
this legislation are best realized if an employer seeking 
:29 The same appears to have been true of Transportation Manage-
ment Corp., in which the Labor Board relied on Mt. Healthy to 
fashion its rules of proof. See 462 U.S. at 403. In Mt. Healthy, 
the Court did not discuss the quality of evidence the employer would 
need to produce to satisfy its burden. 
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to avoid relief is held to a "strict showing" after lia-
bility has been established. 530 F.2d at 1086.30 
It is significant that the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission, the agency principally responsible for 
enforcing Title VII, has adopted the clear and convincing 
approach in the Federal sector, the one arena where the 
Commission has binding regulatory authority. 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1613.271. The Commission's views on Title VII are 
entitled to "great deference," Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 
401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971) ,131 and this is especially true 
where-as here-those views are expressed in a binding 
regulation, as opposed to a guideline. General Electric 
Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 ( 1976). 
The Commission applies the clear and convincing test 
at the relief stage. That is, 29 C.F.R. § 1613.271 deals 
only with "[r] emedial actions" and provides that relief 
for an employee will include retroactive promotion and 
back pay, "unless the record contains clear and convinc-
ing evidence that the employee would not have been pro-
moted or employed at a higher grade, even absent 
discrimination." Id. at § 1613.271 (c) (1) (emphasis 
supplied). 
Petitioner argues that the Court should pay no atten-
tion to this regulation, asserting that EEOC is free to 
impose a higher standard on Federal agencies in the ad-
ministrative setting than they would face in court ( Brief 
30 The substantial importance that Congress attached to Title VII, 
and to civil rights statutes generally, is reflected in part by the 
fee shifting provision in the statute, Section 706 (k), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-5(k), which is a departure from the customary "American 
Rule" on fees. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 
421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). This provision was intended to permit 
a plaintiff to act as a " 'private attorney general,' vindicating a 
policy that Congress considered of the highest priority." Newman 
v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968). See Albe-
marle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 415. 
31 See also EEOC v. Commercial Office Products Co., -- U.S. 
-, 108 S.Ct. 1666 (1988). 
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for Petitioner 41 n.21). Whatever the merits of this 
assertion, that is not what has happened. The Civil 
Service Commission, which formerly had enforcement au-
thority over discrimination complaints against Federal 
agencies, believed that judicial decisions adopting the 
clear and convincing test correctly stated the law, and 
it embraced that standard in its own administrative 
processes. 43 Fed. Reg. 33732 ( 1978) . EEOC, which 
obtained Federal sector enforcement responsibility under 
Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, reprinted in 42 
U.S.C.A. § 2000e-4 at 311, has adhered to the same 
standard. Moreover, as noted above, the same substan-
tive principles govern Title VII cases in both the private 
and Federal sectors. M<Yrton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 
547-312 
Ultimately, any distinction between the clear and con-
vincing and preponderant standards is immaterial here. 
The disputed issue in this Court is whether a violation 
of Title VII was established, not whether proper relief 
was granted, and-as we have shown-the clear and 
convincing test comes into play only after the trial court 
has found a violation, when the burden has shifted to the 
employer to try to limit relief. In any event, petitioner 
never contended below that the proof it offered-which 
32 The Solicitor General's failure to comment on EEOC's position 
in the government's short discussion of the clear and convincing 
issue is curious (Brief for United States 23 n.10). Moreover, the 
government misreads the Court's recent decision in Kungys v. 
United States, -- U.S.--, 108 S.Ct. 1537 (1988). Contrary to 
the government's assertion, Part II-A of the opinion (in which all 
members of the Court joined) expressly reaffirmed that in a de-
naturalization proceeding INS must prove the "materiality" of false 
statements by "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidence. 108 
S.Ct. at 1547. In Part II-B-the portion of the opinion cited by 
the Solicitor General-the plurality does not retreat from this. 
Rather the plurality states that INS need not prove, in addition 
to materiality, that "naturalization would not have been granted 
if the misrepresentations or concealments had not occurred." Id. 
at 1549. Ironically, then, Part II-B rejects exactly the type of rigid 
"but for" causation advocated by petitioner here. 
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failed to meet the clear and convincing test-neverthe-
less satisfied the preponderance of the evidence standard. 
Even now, petitioner does not explain why this would 
be so. 
III. THERE IS NO PERSUASIVE BASIS FOR OVER-
TURNING THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING 
THAT PETITIONER VIOLATED TITLE VII. 
The Solicitor General's legal position is similar in most 
respects to ours. Thus the government believes that the 
plaintiff has the burden of establishing a violation of 
Title VII; that this burden is carried if a plaintiff proves 
that an unlawful motive was causally related to the chal-
lenged decision, even if lawful motives also played a role; 
and that-once violation is established-the burden shifts 
to the defendant to try to limit relief under Section 
706 (g) by providing that the same decision would have 
been reached in a bias-free setting. 
The Solicitor General also acknowledges that "[t]here 
may be sufficient evidence in the record to support a find-
ing that an illegal motive caused petitioner's employment 
decision" ( Brief for United States 27). Here the gov-
ernment points to Thomas Beyer's advice to Ann Hopkins 
to behave "more femininely" as evidence that "could 
support a finding that the decision to deny respondent 
partnership was caused, at least in part, by an impermis-
sible motive" (id.; footnote omitted) .'33 The government 
33 Unlike the dissent below, the Solicitor General sees nothing 
clearly erroneous in the district court's treatment of Beyer's advice. 
As the government observes, the trial court found that Beyer was 
speaking for the partnership, and the record supports this deter-
mination. For example, a member of the Policy Board testified 
that he had "no doubt that Tom Beyer would be the one that would 
have to talk with her [Hopkins]. He knew exactly what the prob-
lems were" (Pet. App. 14a). Perhaps even more significant, Joseph 
Connor, Price Waterhouse's Senior Partner, acknowledged that he 
discussed Hopkins' candidacy with Beyer at the time the Policy 
Board was considering her (J. Connor deposition (see n.2, supra) 
at 87-88). There can be no question that the district court's treat-
ment of Beyer's advice is "plausible in light of the record viewed 
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also notes that comments made by some of the partners 
( e.g., "charm school," "macho") are "consistent with 
this assessment of the reasons for the Policy Board's de-
cision" (id.) .'34 The Solicitor General's reservation is 
not whether the record in this case would support a 
finding that Hopkins' rejection "was caused, at least in 
part, by an impermissible motive"-clearly it would-
but instead is whether the district court made such a 
determination. Hence the government suggests a remand 
so the court can "clarify its findings" ( id. at 28). 
We believe that the Solicitor General's uncertainty on 
this point is unwarranted. No special formulations are 
required, and the district court quite clearly found that 
Hopkins' rejection was caused, in part, by discrimina-
tion ( Pet. App. 56a, 58a-59a, 62a). The government 
agrees that such a finding would have support in the 
record. It is therefore shielded from attack on appeal. 
Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. at 573:35 
in its entirety," Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. at 574, 
so its findings here are immune from attack. Id. 
84 The Equal Employment Advisory Council suggests that such 
comments should have been disregarded, citing cases holding that 
epithets and other derogatory remarks about a person's race or age 
or sex are irrelevant unless made by the decision maker (Brief for 
EEAC 16). This misses the point. Such comments are relevant 
in this case precisely because those partners. with negative views 
were the effective decision makers:. "those who had less than full 
time involvement with Ann, were in effect the deciders on this one" 
( see n.2, supra). 
35 The government may have been misled by the district court's 
statement that petitioner "had legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
sons for distinguishing between [respondent] and the male partners 
with whom she compares herself" (see Brief for United States 28) . 
But Hopkins had advanced more than one argument on liability, and 
in the quoted statement the court was addressing one of Hopkins' 
alternative theories-not the argument on which liability was 
grounded (see pp. 7-8, supra). This Court has recognized that 
"[l]itigants in good faith may raise alternative legal grounds for 
a desired outcome, and the court's rejection of or failure to reach 
certain grounds is not a sufficient reason for reducing [an award 
of attorneys'] fee[s] ." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 
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The district court focused on the causal connection be~ tween discrimination and the partnership denial. The court's opinion is cautious and understated and was premised on its refusal to "accept the view that Con-gress intended to have courts police every instance where subjective judgment may be tainted by unarticulated, unconscious assumptions related to sex" (Pet. App. 55a). Hence it is clear that the court rejected the notion that mere "discrimination in the air"-or, in the Solicitor General's phrase, "stereotyping, without more" ( Brief for United States 24)-violates Title VII. But that was not the situation here.(!6 
It was because of the negative views of some partners who did not know her well that Ann Hopkins did not be-come a partner at Price Waterhouse. The district court found this-"[t]he Policy Board gave great weight to the negative views of individuals who had very little con-tact" with Hopkins ( Pet. App. 55a) -and the firm's Senior Partner confirmed it: "those who had less than full time involvement with Ann, were in effect the de-ciders on this one" ( emphasis supplied; see n.2, supra) . The court cautioned, however, that this "emphasis on negative comments did not, by itself, result in discrimina-tory disparate treatment" (Pet. App. 50a; emphasis sup-plied). Rather, this was only the first of three links that forged the causal chain. 
The second link was the fact that partners' views on Hopkins were "influenced by sex sterotypes" ( Pet. App. 58a). This finding was amply supported (see, e.g., nn. 33-34, supra, and accompanying text), but here again 
( 1983). This presumes, of course, that a trial court may properly reject one of plaintiff's grounds and still find liability on another, as the court did here. 
36 Our difference with the Solicitor General on this point concerns his seeming inattention to the evidence that a handful of negative comments by partners suffices to defeat a partnership candidacy at Price Waterhouse. In his dissent below, Judge Williams also appeared to ignore this pivotal fact. 
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the district court was careful to observe that stereotyping 
-alone-does not violate Title VII. Thus "[t]he com-
ments of the individual partners and the expert evi-
dence . . . do not prove an intentional discriminatory 
motive or purpose" (Pet. App. 54a). 
Instead, the "[c] omments influenced by sex stereo-
types" acquired power precisely because "the firm's eval-
uation process gave [them] substantial weight" (Pet. 
App. 58a). Thus these two factors operated in tandem 
to Hopkins' detriment. And this was not inadvertent: 
"the maintenance of a system that gave weight to such 
biased criticisms was a conscious act of the partnership 
as a whole" ( Pet. App. 56a). This was the third and 
final link in the chain of causation. 
In short, the district court found not merely that part-
ners at Price Waterhouse entertained sexual stereotypes 
when evaluating Hopkins, but also that the firm acted 
on those stereotypes. As the Solicitor General points 
out, evidence of stereotyping is just one of many forms 
that proof of discrimination may take (Brief for United 
States 27). But it is a form in which Congress has 
evinced a special interest. For example, the Senate com-
mittee report on the Equal Employment Opportunity Act 
of 1972, which amended Title VII, reflected the legisla-
tive concern with "stereotypical misconceptions by su-
pervisors regarding minority group capabilities." S. Rep. 
No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1971). The House 
committee report employed virtually identical language. 
H.R. Rep. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 17 ( 1971) .37 
Moreover, in construing Title VII, this Court has held 
that "employment decisions cannot be predicated on mere 
'stereotyped' impressions about the characteristics of 
males or females," City of Los Angeles Department of 
Wate.r & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 707 and that, 
"[i]n forbidding employers to discriminate against in-
dividuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike 
37 The House committee used the term "stereotyped" rather than 
"stereotypical." 
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at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men 
and women resulting from sex stereotypes," id. at n.13, 
quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 
1198 (7th Cir. 1971). See Mississippi University for 
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 729 (1982) ("exclud-
ing males from [nursing school] tends to perpetuate the 
stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively woman's 
job"). 
Given the legislative history of Title VII and this 
Court's decisions, it is evident that the district court 
was not plowing new ground in ruling that an employer 
who acted on stereotypes about women violated the Act. 
See also Fadhl v. City & County of San Francisco, 7 41 
F.2d at 1165; Lynn v. Regents of the University of 
California, 656 F.2d 1337, 1343 n.5 (9th Cir. 1981), 
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 823 (1982) .38 
Price Waterhouse does not have defined standards for 
accepting or rejecting a candidate for partnership based 
on negative comments. Thus the trial court candidly de-
clined to try to measure the precise effect of discrimina-
tion and found rather that "stereotyping played an un-
defined role in blocking plaintiff's admission to the part-
nership in this instance" ( Pet. App. 54a). This was suf-
ficient: "Discriminatory intent is simply not amenable 
to calibration. It either is a factor that has influenced 
the ... choice or it is not." Personnel Administrator 
d;f Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 277. Here the 
court found that it was a factor.39 
138 Fadhl shows that proof that discriminatory stereotyping 
affected conduct need not be grounded on the testimony of an 
expert, since it does not appear that an expert testified on this issue in Fadhl. In the present case, however, the evidence of discrimina-
tion-strong in its own right-was buttressed by entirely consistent expert testimony. See n.13, supra. 
39 It is evident that by "undefined" the trial court meant un-quantifiable, not negligible or insignificant, for the court force-
fully rejected judicial intervention in insignificant matters and said 
that judges should not "police every instance where subjective 
judgment may be tainted" by sex-based assumptions (Pet. App. 55a). 
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In the order accompanying its opinion, the district 
court stated that Hopkins had "prevailed on the merits 
of her claim that denial of partnership in her specific 
situation was ca.used, in part, by defendant's failure to 
protect against the presence of sex discrimination in 
evaluations of her qualifications for partnership ... " 
(Pet. App. 62a; emphasis supplied). This is a straight-
forward determination of causation. And contrary to 
petitioner's suggestion, the court was not imposing any 
novel affirmative action requirement on Price Water-
house. Petitioner knew that "[c] omments influenced by 
sex stereotypes were made by partners" and that "the 
firms' evaluation process gave substantial weight to these 
comments"-yet the firm did nothing about this ( Pet. 
App. 58a). Instead, it "failed to address the conspicuous 
problem of stereotyping in partnership evaluations" (id.). 
This last element was important to the district court's 
determination on liability. In the court's view, petitioner 
could not be charged with responsibility unless the "part-
nership as a whole" knew that its admissions system 
"gave weight to . . . biased criticisms." This was a 
cautious approach (see n. 12, supra), but the court found 
the requisite knowledge. And of course, if the partner-
ship knew of the problem and had tried to rectify the 
situation, then it might not be proper to hold the firm 
culpable for the views of "rogue" partners. But this 
was not the situation here. Price Waterhouse knew what 
was happening and did nothing about it. This was in-
tentional disparate treatment. 
There is no mistaking the thrust of the district court's 
findings. As the court of appeals held, "Hopkins dem-
onstrated, and the district court found, that she was 
treated less favorably than male candidates because of 
her sex" ( Pet. App. 19a). That is, she proved "her 
gender was a significant motivating factor in her failure 
to make partner" (Pet. App. 22a). Of course, other 
motives were also present, and both lawful and unlawful 
motives "were significant factors in the firm's decision" 
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on Hopkins ( Pet. App. 25a) . Thus this was a "case of 
mixed-motivation" ( i.il.). 
Petitioner repeatedly implies that it was the court of 
appeals which first characterized this as a case of mixed 
motives ( e.g., Brief for Petitioner 2, 43). This is plainly 
wrong. It is the findings of the trier of fact that de-
termine whether multiple motives are at work (see n. 
15, swpra), and here the trial court determined that the 
deciison on Hopkins' candidacy was "a mixture of legiti-
mate and discriminatory considerations" ( Pet. App. 59a) . 
The district court found that "[d] iscriminatory stereo--
typing of females was permitted to play a part" in the 
decision on Hopkins (Pet. App. 58a). This was inten-
tional. And there can be no question that petitioner's 
"maintenance of a system that gave weight to ... biased 
criticisms" ( Pet. App. 56a) violates Title VII, since-
at a bare minimum-this was a "limit[ation]" on Hop-
kins that "tend [ed] to deprive [her] of employment op-
portunities ... because of" her sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2 (a) (2). 
In Hisho,n v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984), 
this Court held that decisions on advancement to partner 
status are governed by Title VII. Partnership decisions 
are made collectively and, as this case shows, are often 
the product of a complex procedure and more than one 
motive. In this situation, it would be extraordinarily 
difficult for any employee to carry what petitioner con-
tends is this plaintiff's burden-to prove that she would 
have become a partner except for discrimination. Ac-
ceptance of this contention would rob Hishon of any 
meaning and, as we have shown, would be contrary to 
Title VII's language, history and purposes. 
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CONCLUSION 
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